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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) confers on coal 
workers generally the right to claim workers’ compensation 
benefits for disabilities arising out of coal dust exposure.  30 
U.S.C. §§ 901–45.  Typically, the burden of proof rests on the 
miner to establish each element necessary for entitlement to 
benefits.  For miners who meet particular criteria, however, 
the BLBA provides that certain elements will be presumed, 
subject to rebuttal by the party opposing benefits, i.e., by the 
coal mine operator-employer, if identifiable, or, alternatively, 
by the Secretary of Labor.  30 U.S.C. § 921(c).  At issue in 
this case is whether a 2013 regulation, specifying the standard 
a coal mine operator must meet to rebut the presumed 
element of disability causation, is ultra vires to the BLBA.  
See 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1) (2013).  For the reasons set 
forth below, we agree with the Benefits Review Board’s 
conclusion that operators are subject to the regulation’s 
rebuttal standard because the regulation permissibly fills a 
statutory gap in the legislation.  We also agree that the record 
adequately supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the operator 
did not meet that rebuttal standard in this case.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the award of benefits and deny the operator’s 
petition for review. 
I. Background  
Coal mine operator Helen Mining Company seeks 
review of an award of black lung benefits to Claimant-
Respondent James E. Elliott, Sr.  Before turning to the facts 
of this particular case, we briefly review the historical 
development of the relevant benefits scheme to give context 
to the challenges raised by Helen Mining in this appeal.  
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A. Statutory and Regulatory Context 
In 1969, Congress passed Title IV of the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act, also known as the BLBA, to 
provide benefits to coal miners whose exposure to coal dust 
has resulted in the crippling pulmonary condition of 
pneumoconiosis, commonly known as “black lung.”  Pub. L. 
No. 91-173, § 401, 83 Stat. 742, 792 (1969) (codified as 
amended at 30 U.S.C. § 901); see also Mullins Coal Co. of 
Va. v. Dir., OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 138 (1987).1  To prove 
entitlement to benefits, a miner must establish four elements: 
(1) disease, i.e., he has pneumoconiosis; (2) disease causation, 
i.e., the pneumoconiosis arose out of dust exposure from his 
coal mine employment; (3) disability, i.e., he has a totally 
disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment that prevents 
him from performing coal mining or comparable work; and 
(4) disability causation, i.e., pneumoconiosis is a 
“substantially contributing cause” of his disability.  20 C.F.R. 
§§ 718.204(C)(1), 725.202(d)(2) (citing 20 C.F.R. 
§§ 718.201–718.204); see also Dir., OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 
F.2d 1318, 1320 (3d Cir. 1987).  BLBA benefits were initially 
administered by the Social Security Administration, pursuant 
to regulations promulgated by the then-Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, and were paid from federal funds.  
30 U.S.C. §§ 921–24; Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 
U.S. 680, 683–84 (1991).  Today, such claims for BLBA 
                                              
1 The statutory scheme underlying entitlements to 
black lung benefits, as we have previously noted, “could 
hardly be more complicated,”  Helen Mining Co. v. Dir., 
OWCP (Burnsworth), 924 F.2d 1269, 1271–73 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(en banc), and we do not aspire here to a full exegesis, 
focusing instead on the provisions relevant to this case.  
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benefits are administered by the Director of the Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs, pursuant to regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.  30 U.S.C. §§ 902(c), 
932; Mullins, 484 U.S. at 139. 
 
Congress has amended the BLBA in numerous 
respects over the years, but three have particular relevance to 
this appeal.  First, in an effort to relax the burden on miners to 
prove entitlement to benefits, the Black Lung Benefits Act of 
1972 added a provision establishing that any miner who can 
prove he worked fifteen years or more in an underground coal 
mine and can establish the third element—that he is 
disabled—is entitled to “a rebuttable presumption that [he] is 
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis” and is therefore 
entitled to black lung benefits.  Pub. L. No. 92-303, § 4(c), 86 
Stat. 150, 154 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4)) (hereinafter 
“the § 921(c)(4) presumption”); Pauley, 501 U.S. at 685.2  In 
essence, if a miner could prove qualifying employment and 
disability, then the other elements, including disability 
causation, would be presumed to be met as well, shifting the 
burden to the party opposing benefits—at that point in time, 
the Secretary—to rebut the presumption by means specified 
in § 921(c)(4).  As to the element of disability causation, for 
example, § 921(c)(4) specified that the Secretary may rebut 
by “establishing that … [the miner’s] respiratory or 
                                              
 2 This rebuttable presumption specifically benefits 
miners whose pneumoconiosis is not sufficiently pervasive to 
manifest itself in a chest X-ray.  See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).  
For miners who can prove the disease by chest X-ray, the 
presumption of entitlement to benefits is irrebuttable.  30 
U.S.C. § 921(c)(3). 
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pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection 
with, employment in a coal mine.”  30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4)(B); 
see also Pauley, 501 U.S. at 685–86.3   
Second, the BLBA from its inception had anticipated a 
gradual transition to the processing of claims by approved 
state workers’ compensation programs or, in the absence of 
an approved program, by the Secretary himself, with mine 
operators bearing financial responsibility for the payment of 
benefits.  See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, § 422, 83 Stat. 741, 796–97 (codified as amended at 30 
U.S.C. § 932).  But the 1972 Act set the date for that 
transition as January 1, 1974, providing that all claims filed 
on or after that date would be paid not from federal funds, but 
by the private coal mine operator that employed the miner, 
see Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, § 5(1), (2), 86 Stat. 
150, 155 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 932), and a 
subsequent amendment ensured that if a responsible operator 
could not be identified, benefits would be paid by a fund, 
administered by the Secretary, into which mine operators 
would contribute.4  Thus, from that point forward, 
                                              
3 The statute provides, in the alternative, that the 
Secretary may rebut the presumption by disproving the 
disease element, specifically by “establishing that … [the 
miner claiming the presumption] does not, or did not, have 
pneumoconiosis.”  30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4)(A).  This is the only 
other rebuttal method prescribed for the Secretary, and it is 
not relevant to this appeal. 
 
4 The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund was created by 
the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977.  See Pub. L. 
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the party opposing benefits would be not only the Secretary, 
but either the Secretary or the mine operator, depending on 
which was the payor. 
Finally, in another amendment passed in 1977, 
Congress expanded the definition of pneumoconiosis beyond 
the class of clinical diseases recognized as pneumoconiosis 
(so-called “clinical pneumoconiosis”) to include “any chronic 
dust disease of the lung … arising out of coal mine 
employment” (now referred to as “legal pneumoconiosis”).  
Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
239, sec. 2(a), § 402(b), 92 Stat. 95, 95 (codified at 30 U.S.C. 
§ 902(b)); see 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a).  The upshot of this 
amendment, when considered together with § 921(c)(4), was 
that the disease and disease causation elements overlapped, so 
if the Secretary could not rebut the presumption by proving 
that the miner did not have a disease “arising out of coal mine 
employment” (elements one and two), 30 U.S.C. § 902(b); 
see supra note 3, then he could only rebut disability causation 
by showing that the miner’s impairment did not result from 
that disease (element four).  See 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). 
 
Soon after these amendments took effect, however, 
“the number of black lung benefit claims soared,” B & G 
Constr. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 662 F.3d 233, 242 (3d Cir. 2011), 
leading Congress to reverse course and amend the § 921(c)(4) 
presumption so that it would no longer apply to claims filed 
on or after January 1, 1982, see Black Lung Benefits Revenue 
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97, § 202(b)(1), 95 Stat. 1635, 1643.  
For the next several decades, miners applying for benefits 
                                                                                                     
No. 95-227, §§ 2–3, 95 Stat. 11, 11–15 (1978) (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4121; 30 U.S.C. § 934). 
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under the Act could not claim the benefit of the § 921(c)(4) 
presumption.   
With the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
however, Congress changed its mind once more and revived 
the § 921(c)(4) presumption for all claims filed after January 
1, 2005 that were still pending on or after March 23, 2010.  
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556(a), (c), 124 Stat. 119, 260 
(2010).  For the reasons explained, the party opposing 
benefits at this point in time could be either the Secretary or 
the mine operator.  However, when Congress reinstated 
§ 921(c)(4), it did not alter the original language of that 
provision.  Thus, while the presumption would apply to any 
qualifying miner as against any opposing party, the statute 
still specified only how “the Secretary”—originally, the only 
opposing party—could rebut the presumed elements, and 
made no explicit provision for rebuttal by operators. 
The following year, the Department of Labor 
promulgated a regulation to fill that gap and to expound on 
the rebuttal standard.  20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (2013) (hereinafter 
“the Regulation”); see also Regulations Implementing the 
Byrd Amendments to the Black Lung Benefits Act: 
Determining Coal Miners’ and Survivors’ Entitlement to 
Benefits, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,102, 59,106–07 (Sept. 25, 2013).5  
The Regulation thus prescribes the means of rebuttal for any 
                                              
5 Although Elliott applied for benefits in 2012 and the 
Regulation was not promulgated until the following year, the 
Regulation “applies to all claims filed after January 1, 2005, 
and pending on or after March 23, 2010.”  20 C.F.R. 
§ 718.305(a) (2013).  Thus, Helen Mining does not challenge 
its applicability to Elliott on this ground. 
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“party opposing entitlement” to benefits, encompassing both 
the Secretary and mine operators.  20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1) 
(2013).  And to rebut the presumed element of disability 
causation, the Regulation specifies that, short of disproving 
the presence of disease,6 such opposing party must 
“[e]stablish[] that no part of the miner’s respiratory or 
pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis.”  
20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1)(ii) (2013).  Put another way, the 
opposing party must “rule out” any connection between 
pneumoconiosis and a miner’s disability.  See Kline v. Dir., 
OWCP, 877 F.2d 1175, 1179 (3d Cir. 1989) (describing a 
regulation with similar “no part” language as imposing a “rule 
out” standard).  The validity of the Regulation and, in 
particular, its imposition of the rule out standard on mine 
operators, is the central issue on appeal. 
B. Factual and Procedural History 
 Elliott worked in a coal mine for over twenty-three 
years, until 1993.  During that time, he developed a chronic 
cough, and about three or four years after his retirement, he 
developed more acute breathing problems characterized by 
shortness of breath and chest pain.  Elliott timely filed a claim 
for benefits under the BLBA in September 2012, alleging that 
he suffered from respiratory difficulties due to his coal mine 
employment.  The Director of the United States Department 
of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, issued 
                                              
6 Consistent with the alternate means of rebuttal 
provided by the statute, see supra note 3, the Regulation also 
provides that a party opposing the award of benefits may 
rebut the presumption by disproving the presence of the 
disease in its legal or clinical form.  20 C.F.R. § 
718.305(d)(1)(i) (2013).   
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a proposed Decision and Order awarding benefits on June 4, 
2013.  Petitioner Helen Mining conceded it was the 
responsible employer, but it challenged Elliott’s entitlement 
to benefits and requested a formal hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).   
 At an April 2014 hearing before an ALJ, the parties 
stipulated that Elliott suffered from a totally disabling 
respiratory impairment.  Because Helen Mining thus 
conceded disability and because Elliott demonstrated a term 
of employment greater than fifteen years,7 the ALJ 
determined that § 921(c)(4) applied and that the other 
elements, including disability causation, would be presumed.  
Elliott thus was presumed totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis, and the ALJ shifted the burden to Helen 
                                              
 7 The § 921(c)(4) presumption applies only if the 
miner’s fifteen years of work were performed underground.  
See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).  However, employment “in 
conditions substantially similar to those in underground 
mines” will qualify if the miner can demonstrate that he was 
“regularly exposed to coal-mine dust while working there.”  
20 C.F.R. § 718.305(b)(1)(i), (b)(2).  Elliott worked 
underground for only ten years, but the ALJ credited his 
testimony regarding the “dusty conditions of his aboveground 
mining positions” and thus determined that he had shown 
enough total years of qualifying work to invoke the 
presumption.  Helen Mining challenged this finding on its 
appeal to the Benefits Review Board, but the Board rejected 
it, and Helen Mining has waived the issue on appeal by 
failing to raise it in its opening brief to this Court.  See 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994).  
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Mining to rebut the other elements as permitted by the 
Regulation.  
 
 As part of its effort to rebut the presumption, Helen 
Mining offered the opinions of Doctors Gregory Fino and 
Samuel Spagnolo, both of whom attributed Elliott’s 
respiratory impairment to a diagnosis of adult-onset asthma 
unrelated to coal dust exposure.  The ALJ did not find their 
testimony persuasive and concluded that Helen Mining had 
failed to rule out coal dust-induced pneumoconiosis as a 
cause of Elliott’s disability and thus had failed to rebut the 
presumption.  20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1).8  He therefore 
awarded benefits to Elliott.  
 
 On appeal to the Benefits Review Board (the “BRB,” 
or “the Board”), Helen Mining argued that the ALJ should not 
have required it to meet the rule out standard prescribed by 
the Regulation because the Regulation, which imposes that 
rebuttal burden on both operators and the Secretary, should be 
deemed ultra vires to the statute, which imposes it on the 
Secretary alone.  The BRB rejected this argument, 
specifically holding that the Regulation is valid and that the 
ALJ was correct to apply it here because the Regulation 
                                              
 8 Elliott also argued before the ALJ that he could 
establish disability causation even without the benefit of 
§ 921(c)(4)’s presumption, and, to that end, he proffered 
testimony and reports of experts who had diagnosed him with 
qualifying diseases that they opined were caused, at least in 
part, from coal mine dust exposure.  The ALJ did not find 
those experts persuasive either but concluded their opinions 
were inconsequential because the presumption did apply and 
Helen Mining did not satisfy the rule out standard to rebut it.   
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“fill[s] the statutory gap created by the omission of a specific 
reference to responsible operators, clarif[ies] ambiguous 
phraseology, and effectuate[s] the purposes of the Act, i.e., to 
compensate miners with fifteen or more years of coal mine 
employment who are disabled by pneumoconiosis.”  JA 10a.  
The Board proceeded to hold that the ALJ correctly applied 
that standard and that, having reasonably rejected the 
opinions of Helen Mining’s medical experts, the ALJ 
properly concluded Helen Mining had failed to rebut the 
presumption.  The Board therefore affirmed the ALJ’s 
decision, and Helen Mining petitioned this Court for review.9 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The BRB had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision 
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as incorporated by 30 
U.S.C. § 932(a).  This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
because Elliott’s exposure to coal mine dust occurred in 
                                              
 9 Although the ALJ based his ruling on the Regulation, 
20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d), which imposes the rule out standard 
on the party seeking to rebut disability causation, he also at 
several points described the presumption as establishing that 
pneumoconiosis was a “substantially contributing cause” of 
Elliott’s disability.  JA 29a–30a, 32a, 34a–35a.  That 
language may have been imprecise, but it is clear that the ALJ 
in fact applied the rule out standard by requiring Helen 
Mining to provide medical evidence completely 
“disassociating” Elliott’s disability from any coal dust-related 
disease and concluding Helen Mining had not met its burden 
under the Regulation.  JA 34a.  The Board affirmed that 
determination, and the application of the Regulation’s rule out 
standard to operators is therefore squarely before us on 
appeal.   
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Pennsylvania, and 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), as incorporated by 30 
U.S.C. § 932(a), allows an aggrieved party to seek review of a 
BRB decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Circuit in 
which the injury occurred.  
We review the Board’s decision only to determine 
“whether an error of law has been committed and whether the 
Board has adhered to its scope of review.”  Hill v. Dir., 
OWCP, 562 F.3d 264, 268 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Kowalchick v. Dir., OWCP, 893 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 
1990)).  “We exercise plenary review over the ALJ’s legal 
conclusions that were adopted by the Board.”  Id.  
Furthermore, “[t]he Board is bound by the ALJ’s findings of 
fact if they are supported by substantial evidence,” but if a 
petitioner challenges a finding of fact, “we must 
independently review the record and decide whether the 
ALJ’s findings are rational, consistent with applicable law 
and supported by substantial evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.”  Id.  Substantial evidence is “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”  Id. 
III. Discussion 
 Helen Mining raises on appeal the same two issues it 
raised before the Board.  That is, first, it challenges the 
validity of the Regulation to the extent it imposes on 
operators (and not merely on the Secretary) the burden to 
rebut disability causation using the rule out standard, and 
second, it contends that even if the Regulation applies, it 
satisfied the rule out standard through expert medical 
evidence that the ALJ erroneously rejected.  As explained 
below, we find each of these arguments unavailing.  
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A. Validity of Regulation 
We first consider Helen Mining’s challenge to the 
Regulation’s imposition of the rule out standard on operators.   
In addressing the validity of a regulation promulgated through 
notice-and-comment procedures, we apply the familiar two-
step analysis of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  If Congress has 
directly and clearly spoken to the precise question at issue, 
our Chevron analysis is complete at Step One, and Congress’s 
unambiguously expressed intent controls.  Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 842–43.  If, however, we determine that Congress has not 
addressed “the precise question at issue,” whether by being 
“silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” or by 
leaving “a gap for the agency to fill,” then we must proceed to 
the second step and determine whether the agency’s 
construction of the statute is reasonable.  Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 843–44.10 
                                              
 10 As a threshold matter, Chevron deference is only 
appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated 
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”  
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  
The Secretary of Labor is authorized to promulgate rules and 
regulations necessary for the administration and enforcement 
of the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. § 936(a), and the parties do not 
challenge the exercise of that authority to promulgate the 
Regulation through notice-and-comment rulemaking here. 
Even greater deference is due when Congress has left 
not merely an implicit gap for the agency to fill but has made 
an “express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate 
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1. Chevron Step One 
Helen Mining urges that the validity of the Regulation 
be resolved at Step One because, in its view, the requirement 
that operators rule out any connection between disease and 
disability is contrary to the intent of Congress as clearly and 
unambiguous expressed in § 921(c)(4).  In a nutshell, Helen 
Mining’s argument is that: (a) by providing miners with a 
presumption described as “rebuttable,” Congress confirmed 
that any opposing party—whether the Secretary or an 
operator—has the opportunity to rebut disability causation; 
(b) Congress expressly constrained the Secretary to rebut 
disability causation by “establishing that … [the miner’s 
disease] did not arise out of, or in connection with, 
employment in a coal mine,” 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4), and was 
silent as to the rebuttal standard for operators; ergo (c) 
Congress clearly and unambiguously intended to allow 
                                                                                                     
a specific provision of the statute by regulation,” which then 
must be given “controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843–44.  Arguably, that is the case here, for in 
addition to delegating general rulemaking, Congress directed 
the Secretary to, “by regulation[,] prescribe standards for 
determining … whether a miner is totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis,” 30 U.S.C. § 921(b), and the standard for an 
operator to rebut a presumption that a miner is totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis could be viewed as falling in 
this category.  We do not reach this question, however, both 
because it was not addressed by the parties, and because we 
conclude that even applying the lesser deference afforded by 
the traditional two-step Chevron inquiry, the Regulation still 
stands. 
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operators to rebut disability causation without having to 
“establish[] that … [the disease] did not arise out of, or in 
connection with, employment in a coal mine,” id.  Building 
on this syllogism, Helen Mining reasons, the Regulation’s 
rule out standard—interpreting § 921(c)(4) to require any 
party opposing benefits to “[e]stablish[] that no part of the 
miner’s respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused 
by pneumoconiosis,” 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1)(ii)—is ultra 
vires to the extent it purports to apply to operators.   
 
The flaw in Helen Mining’s logic is apparent in its 
premise:  The fact that Congress spoke explicitly to the 
rebuttal standard for the Secretary and was silent as to 
operators is the very reason we must conclude that Congress 
did not unambiguously reject or accept that rebuttal standard 
for operators.  “[S]uch silence, after all, normally creates 
ambiguity.  It does not resolve it.”  Barnhart v. Walton, 535 
U.S. 212, 218 (2002).  And our inquiry is only resolved at 
Chevron Step One if “Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.  
Where, as here, Congress has not done so, and is instead 
“silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” 
leaving “a gap for the agency to fill,” controlling precedent 
directs that the agency is indeed empowered to fill that void.  
Id.  The Regulation is a textbook example of an agency filling 
such a void, and its validity therefore must be addressed at 
Chevron Step Two. 
 
This conclusion is reinforced when we consider 
§ 921(c)(4) “in context,” interpreting the statute to create “a 
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.”  FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 
(2000).  The BLBA elsewhere provides that black lung 
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benefits are only available to miners who are disabled “due 
to” pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. § 901(a)—language we 
previously recognized may invoke a broad range of meanings 
and thus does not clearly and unambiguously identify the 
standard for proving disability causation.  Bonessa v. U.S.  
Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 726, 728–29, 733 (3d Cir. 1989).  At 
the time we examined the statute in Bonessa, the standard for 
a living miner to affirmatively prove disability causation had 
not yet been defined by regulation, so we imported the 
“substantially contributing cause” standard that had been 
articulated by the agency for survivors seeking death benefits, 
id. at 728–29, 733–34, and the agency subsequently 
incorporated that very standard into a new regulation directed 
at living miners who cannot claim the benefit of the 
presumption, 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c); see Regulations 
Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 
of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79.920, 79,948 (Dec. 20, 
2000).  Just as Congress’s silence in § 901(a) created a void 
for the agency to set the causal standard for miners proving 
entitlement, Bonessa, 884 F.2d at 728, 733, so too did 
Congress’s silence in § 921(c)(4) create a void for the agency 
to set the causal standard for operators seeking to rebut the 
presumption of entitlement.  In neither case do we read that 
silence as an affirmative rejection or acceptance of a 
particular standard at Chevron Step One.11 
                                              
11 For that reason, Helen Mining fares no better in 
arguing that § 921(c)(4) reflects Congress’s unambiguous 
adoption of a modified “substantially contributing cause” 
standard than it does in arguing that § 921(c)(4) reflects 
Congress’s unambiguous rejection of the rule out standard.  
No doubt, construing the statute as a whole in the absence of 
the Regulation, Helen Mining’s construction might have more 
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 Helen Mining, however, contends that we are bound to 
do just that and to hold that Congress unambiguously rejected 
a rule out standard for miners in light of Usery v. Turner 
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).  Usery considered a 
challenge by a group of operators to the § 921(c)(4) 
presumption soon after it was created by the Black Lung 
Benefits Act of 1972.  See id. at 5, 11–12, 37.  The operators 
argued that they should be permitted to oppose benefits 
without being subject to the statutory rebuttal standard 
imposed on the Secretary, and the Court agreed, reasoning 
that it was “clear as a matter of statutory construction that the 
[§ 921(c)(4)] limitation on rebuttal evidence is inapplicable to 
operators.  By the language of [§ 921(c)(4)], the limitation 
applies only to ‘the Secretary’ and not to an operator seeking 
to avoid liability ….”  Id. at 35 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-
1048, at 8 (1972) (Conf. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 92-780, at 8 
                                                                                                     
traction, for there would be internal consistency in adopting 
as the standard by which operators must rebut disability 
causation when it is presumed, i.e., that pneumoconiosis was 
not a “substantially contributing cause” of the miner’s 
disability, the inverse of the standard by which minors must 
establish disability causation in the absence of such a 
presumption, i.e., that pneumoconiosis was a “substantially 
contributing cause” of their disability.  See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 718.204(c)(1).  But the Regulation adopts a different 
standard, see 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1)(ii), and at Chevron 
Step One, we look to whether the “administrative 
construction[] [is] contrary to clear congressional intent,” 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, not whether the statute could 
reasonably be construed another way “in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation” id. at 843.  
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(1972) (Conf. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 92-743, at 12 (1972)).12  The 
Court went on to note, however, that it was not addressing 
whether a regulation could permissibly fill that gap in the law, 
and while it acknowledged that the Secretary had 
promulgated an implementing regulation that appeared to 
apply to claims payable by operators, it declined to consider 
the validity of that regulation because it had not been raised 
by the parties.  Id. at 37.  In short, by establishing that the 
statute is silent as to operators and leaving open the 
                                              
12 We also note that this holding from Usery has little 
bearing on the statute as it operates today, given the statutory 
amendments that have been passed since the time of that 
decision.  At the time Usery was decided, only disabilities 
caused by clinical pneumoconiosis were compensable under 
the Act, and therefore the statutory rebuttal methods were 
truly limiting in that they did not allow a party to rebut the 
causal element by proving that a miner was not entitled to 
benefits because he was disabled by some other coal dust-
induced lung disease that was not clinical pneumoconiosis.  
See Usery, 428 U.S. at 34–35.  Now, however, the statute has 
been amended to cover benefits for disabilities arising from 
any “chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae … 
arising out of coal mine employment,” known as “legal 
pneumoconiosis.”  Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 95, 95 (codified at 30 
U.S.C. § 902(b)); 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2).  Because all 
totally disabling lung diseases caused by coal dust exposure 
are now covered under the Act, the operators’ concerns 
expressed in Usery that they would be prohibited from 
presenting relevant evidence to rebut the link between 
pneumoconiosis and disability no longer pertain.  See W. Va. 
CWP Fund v. Bender, 782 F.3d 129, 139 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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possibility that this silence could be filled by regulation, 
Usery, if anything, confirms that this question may not be 
resolved at Chevron Step One.13   
 
Having concluded that § 924(c) is “silent or 
ambiguous” as to the rebuttal standard for operators and that 
Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43, we must proceed to 
consider the Regulation at Step Two of the Chevron analysis.   
2. Chevron Step Two 
At Step Two, we consider whether the agency’s 
regulation that fills a statutory gap is “based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  We 
must still at this stage consider the plain language of the 
statute, along with its origin and purpose, in reviewing the 
reasonableness of the regulation, see Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 
F.3d 98, 119 (3d Cir. 2005), but if the regulation reflects a 
reasonable statutory interpretation, we will defer to that 
                                              
13 Helen Mining also highlights Judge Niemeyer’s 
reliance on Usery in his concurrence in Mingo Logan Coal 
Co. v. Owens to argue that the plain language of the statute 
permitted an operator to rebut using a “substantially 
contributing cause” standard.  724 F.3d 550, 560–61 (4th Cir. 
2013) (Niemeyer, J., concurring).  That concurrence, 
however, was published about two months before the 
Regulation went into effect, and the Fourth Circuit 
subsequently considered and affirmed the validity of the 
Regulation, noting that Judge Niemeyer’s concurrence in 
Owens “did not consider the language of any regulation.”  
Bender, 782 F.3d at 140 n.12. 
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construction, even if we may have interpreted the statute 
otherwise, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.   
 
Here, Helen Mining devoted the bulk of its briefing 
and argument to Chevron Step One, only weakly contesting 
the reasonableness of the Regulation.14  And for three good 
reasons.   
 
First, the Regulation furthers Congress’s goals in 
enacting § 924(c).  The sequence of legislative amendments 
here—the enactment of § 924(c) specifying the presumption 
and the means of rebuttal for “the Secretary” at a time when 
the Secretary was the only payor, the repeal of § 924(c), and 
its eventual revival at a point in time when operators were the 
primary payors—itself suggests that Congress may well have 
intended § 924(c) to reach any party opposing benefits and 
that its failure to further amend the statute upon reinstatement 
                                              
14 At some points Helen Mining appears to concede 
Step Two.  See Oral Argument at 14:38 (No. 16-1058), 
available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings (responding to question whether Helen Mining 
disputes the reasonableness of the regulation at Chevron Step 
Two by stating, “Not based on the case law that’s out there.  
No.”).  However, at other points it appears to argue that a 
more reasonable interpretation of § 921(c)(4) would require 
operators to meet the “substantially contributing cause” 
standard required for miners not entitled to the presumption.  
Pet’r’s Br. 28–29 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(1)).  
Reasonable as it may be however, see supra note 11, Helen 
Mining’s interpretation does not render the agency’s different 
interpretation an unreasonable one.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843 n.11. 
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to include operators “reflects nothing more than a drafting 
error” that “needs common sense revision.”  G.L. v. Ligonier 
Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 2015).  
That is to say, the Regulation can be viewed not merely as a 
reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute, but as the 
proper construction of the statute as Congress intended it.  
That conclusion is reinforced when we consider that Congress 
imposed § 924(c)(4)’s presumption because Congress had 
become “[d]issatisfied with the increasing backlog of 
unadjudicated claims and the relatively high rate of claim 
denials” under the original Act, Pauley, 501 U.S. at 685, and 
it sought to give preference to those miners most at risk for 
disease because of their long-term coal dust exposure, see S. 
Rep. No. 92-743, at 11 (1972).  Placing a heightened burden 
on the party seeking to overcome the presumption—whether 
that party is the Secretary or the operator—reinforces that 
preference and expedites the processing of these claims. 
 
Second, we have long approved of the rule out 
standard as a reasonable burden of proof for operators seeking 
to disprove disability causation and to avoid paying black 
lung benefits.  In Carozza v. U.S. Steel Corp., 727 F.2d 74 (3d 
Cir. 1984), for example, we addressed a similar regulation 
that required operators to rule out a connection between 
disability and pneumoconiosis in order to overcome an 
interim presumption.15  Recognizing that pneumoconiosis 
                                              
15  Although this case predated Chevron, we employed 
an analysis that closely tracked the test eventually adopted by 
the Supreme Court in that case.  See Carozza, 727 F.2d at 78; 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.  The interim presumption that 
was at issue was established by a now-superseded 
Department of Labor regulation under the Black Lung 
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may contribute to a miner’s disability by aggravating other 
non-work-related conditions, we held that the Secretary’s 
decision to require a party opposing benefits to rule out even 
such a slight connection between pneumoconiosis and 
disability was in accord with workers’ compensation 
principles, “consistent with the remedial purposes of 
Congress[,] and well within the rulemaking authority 
conferred on the Secretary.”  Id. at 78 & n.1; see also Kline, 
877 F.2d at 1178–79. 
 
Third, it is particularly appropriate for us to defer to 
the agency’s interpretation of this statute because it forms the 
basis for a complex regulatory scheme.  While some 
distinguished jurists have recently raised thought-provoking 
questions about the proper bounds of Chevron and judicial 
deference, see, e.g., Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851 
F.3d 263, 278–83 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 
1151–55 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring), there 
remains general consensus that such deference is appropriate 
where the agency oversees a “complex and highly technical” 
                                                                                                     
Benefits Reform Act of 1977 and established that any miner 
who worked for at least ten years and could demonstrate one 
of a list of medical criterion was presumed to be disabled due 
to pneumoconiosis.  See Carozza, 727 F.2d at 76 (citing 20 
C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (1983)); Pauley, 501 U.S. at 688–89.  
Like the Regulation here, the Department of Labor regulation 
also provided that the party opposing benefits could rebut the 
presumption by establishing that “the total disability or death 
of the miner did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine 
employment.”  20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3) (1983) (emphasis 
added); see also Pauley, 501 U.S. at 688–89. 
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regulatory program, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 
U.S. 504, 512 (1994), or has particular substantive expertise 
and specialized experience, see FERC v. Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782–84 (2016); Egan, 834 F.3d at 281–
82 (Jordan, J., concurring).16  Here, as the Supreme Court 
observed, the BLBA created a “highly technical regulatory 
program,” and “[t]he identification and classification of 
medical eligibility criteria” for that program “necessarily 
require significant expertise and entail the exercise of 
judgment grounded in policy concerns.”  Pauley, 501 U.S. at 
697.  In promulgating the Regulation, the agency applied that 
experience and judgment to weigh the competing standards 
and to adopt the rule out standard.  See Regulations 
Implementing the Byrd Amendments to the Black Lung 
Benefits Act: Determining Coal Miners’ and Survivors’ 
Entitlement to Benefits, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,102, 59,106–07 
(Sept. 25, 2013).  While Helen Mining’s “substantially 
contributing cause” standard may also be reasonable, “the 
                                              
16 See, e.g., ECM BioFilms, Inc. v. FTC, 851 F.3d 599 
(6th Cir. 2017); Baylor Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. Price, 850 F.3d 
257, 264 (5th Cir. 2017); Defenders of Wildlife v. Zinke, 849 
F.3d 1077, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Compassion Over Killing 
v. FDA, 849 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Vehicle 
Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 86 n.17 (3d Cir. 
2017); Buffalo Transp., Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 381, 
385 (2d Cir. 2016); Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
832 F.3d 654, 668 (7th Cir. 2016); Doe v. Cape Elizabeth 
Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 69, 77 n.7 (1st Cir. 2016); WildEarth 
Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 784 F.3d 677, 683 
(10th Cir. 2015); Bender, 782 F.3d at 142; Draper v. Colvin, 
779 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 2015); Davis v. Producers Agric. 
Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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Secretary’s interpretation need not be the best or most natural 
one … to warrant deference,” Pauley, 501 U.S. at 702, and 
we cannot say that the heavier burden that the Regulation 
places on operators is unreasonable. 
 
For all of these reasons, we hold that the Regulation is 
a permissible exercise of the Secretary’s rulemaking power 
and join the other Courts of Appeals that consistently have 
reached that conclusion.  See Bender, 782 F.3d at 143; Big 
Branch Res., Inc. v. Ogle, 737 F.3d 1063, 1071 n.5 (6th Cir. 
2013); cf. Antelope Coal Co./Rio Tinto Energy Am. v. 
Goodin, 743 F.3d 1331, 1347 (10th Cir. 2014) (declining to 
address the operator’s ultra vires argument).   
B. Application of the Regulation to this Case 
Assuming the validity of the Regulation, Helen Mining 
also argues that it produced evidence sufficient to rebut the 
§ 921(c)(4) presumption even under the rule out standard, and 
that the ALJ only concluded it did not because he improperly 
rejected Helen Mining’s medical expert testimony.  In 
reviewing an ALJ’s interpretation of expert medical evidence, 
we bear in mind that “[t]he Board is bound by an ALJ’s 
findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence,” 
and therefore we must review the record to “decide whether 
the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence,” 
defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  
Kowalchick, 893 F.2d at 619–20.  “Physicians’ reasoning, 
consideration of records, and credentials are relevant to an 
ALJ's determination” whether to reject medical expert 
opinions, and an ALJ may properly reject such opinions if 
they are “inadequately explained, insufficiently reasoned, or 
Case: 16-1058     Document: 003112650219     Page: 25      Date Filed: 06/14/2017
26 
 
contrary to clinical evidence.”  Balsavage v. Dir., OWCP, 295 
F.3d 390, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 
The error ascribed by Helen Mining is twofold: first, 
that the ALJ discredited its experts based on a 
misunderstanding of the Preamble to a relevant regulation 
and, second, that the ALJ mischaracterized a portion of one 
expert’s testimony.  We address each argument in turn. 
 
First, Helen Mining argues that the ALJ incorrectly 
deemed its experts’ testimony to conflict with the Preamble to 
the 2001 revision to 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (hereinafter “the 
Preamble”).  See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 79,920, 79,939 (Dec. 20, 2000).  The testimony at issue 
is that of Dr. Fino—opining that Elliott was disabled by 
asthma and that dust exposure from coal mine employment 
could not be the source of that impairment because asthma 
cannot be caused by coal dust inhalation—and that of Dr. 
Spagnolo—opining that Elliott had asthma that impaired his 
lung function but could not be due to coal dust exposure 
because prior coal dust exposure would “probably not” 
aggravate asthma once a worker left the mine.  The ALJ 
determined that these opinions were entitled to little weight, 
in part because they contradicted the Department’s findings 
on the connection between asthma and coal dust exposure as 
reflected in the Preamble.  The relevant section of the 
Preamble reads: 
 
The term “chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease” (COPD) includes three disease 
processes characterized by airway dysfunction: 
chronic bronchitis, emphysema and asthma.  
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Airflow limitation and shortness of breath are 
features of COPD, and lung function testing is 
used to establish its presence.  Clinical studies, 
pathological findings, and scientific evidence 
regarding the cellular mechanisms of lung 
injury link, in a substantial way, coal mine dust 
exposure to pulmonary impairment and chronic 
obstructive lung disease.  
 
65 Fed. Reg. at 79,920, 79,939. 
 
This Preamble reflects the agency’s assessment of 
medical and scientific evidence upon which it relied in 
drafting the 2001 revision to the regulatory definition of 
pneumoconiosis.  Id. at 79,920, 79,939.  Because an “ALJ 
should reject as insufficiently reasoned any medical opinion 
that reaches a conclusion contrary to objective clinical 
evidence without explanation,” Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal 
Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986), an ALJ may 
reasonably rely on the agency’s findings expressed in the 
Preamble in determining how much weight to assign to an 
expert’s opinion, see Helen Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP 
(Obush), 650 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
Here, the ALJ observed that the agency had already 
recognized a proven link between coal dust exposure and 
pulmonary impairments like asthma, and he reasonably 
interpreted the opinions of Drs. Fino and Spagnolo as being 
contrary to that position.  Although at times the Preamble 
references broad categories of respiratory diseases, it 
specifically cites at least one example of a study that 
demonstrates the link between coal dust exposure and asthma.  
See 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,943.  Tellingly, the Preamble also 
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explicitly identifies Dr. Fino as an expert known to disagree 
with the conclusions expressed in the Preamble and explains 
that the agency does not credit his opinion because it is not 
“in accord with the prevailing view of the medical community 
or the substantial weight of the medical and scientific 
literature.”  65 Fed. Reg. at 79,939.  Neither of Helen 
Mining’s experts cited a scientific study or treatise to 
challenge the agency’s assessment or to support their 
conclusions that coal dust inhalation would not cause asthma 
or aggravate it after leaving work in the mines.  We therefore 
conclude, as the BRB did, that the ALJ’s findings in this 
respect were supported by substantial evidence.  See Obush, 
650 F.3d at 256–57. 
 
Second, Helen Mining argues that the ALJ 
mischaracterized Dr. Fino’s testimony as internally 
inconsistent and improperly discounted it on that basis.  Our 
own review of the record assures us that the ALJ’s 
discounting of this testimony on the basis of its internal 
discrepancies is also supported by substantial evidence.  Dr. 
Fino acknowledged that Elliott reported the onset of his 
cough while working in the mines, and he conceded that the 
cough may have then been associated with coal dust; at the 
same time, however, Dr. Fino attributed Elliott’s cough to 
asthma that he “believe[d]” began after Elliott left the mines.  
JA 77a.  We agree with the ALJ that Dr. Fino did not 
adequately explain those inconsistencies. 
 
Helen Mining now attempts to supply such an 
explanation by distinguishing Elliott’s prior cough due to coal 
dust exposure from his current symptoms, which Helen 
Mining describes as shortness of breath due to asthma.   But 
that cannot be reconciled with Dr. Fino’s testimony—which 
Case: 16-1058     Document: 003112650219     Page: 28      Date Filed: 06/14/2017
29 
 
refers to both the coughing “[t]hat began while [Elliott] was 
working in the mines” and “the cough that he’s having now” 
and states that “it’s all due to asthma.”  JA 77a:6-14, 78a:2-4.  
Rather, the record, in view of Dr. Fino’s failure to 
disassociate that cough from coal dust exposure, supports the 
ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Fino’s persuasiveness.  See Mancia 
v. Dir., OWCP, 130 F.3d 579, 593 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 
In sum, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the medical 
expert testimony of Helen Mining’s experts, and absent that 
testimony, the record does not otherwise provide a basis to 
rebut the presumption of Elliott’s entitlement to benefits.  
Accordingly, we agree with the BRB that the ALJ’s 
conclusion that Helen Mining failed to overcome the 
§ 921(c)(4) presumption was supported by substantial 
evidence.  See Kowalchick, 893 F.2d at 619; Lango v. Dir., 
OWCP, 104 F.3d 573, 576–78 (3d Cir. 1997). 
IV. Conclusion 
Because we conclude that the Regulation’s imposition 
of a rule out standard on operators is not ultra vires to the 
BLBA, and because we conclude the ALJ did not err in 
rejecting the only evidence Helen Mining proffered to rebut 
the § 921(c)(4) presumption in this case, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
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